This blog post discusses whether it is ethically appropriate to alter a child’s traits through genetic modification and whether it can actually have a positive impact on the child’s happiness.
‘The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering’ is a book by Michael Sandel, world-renowned for ‘Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do?’, which expresses reservations about altering children’s traits through genetic engineering and high-pressure education. In the book, the author argues that high-pressure parenting stemming from parental overzealousness and altering a child’s traits through genetic manipulation are fundamentally similar and should be avoided. In other words, a child is a ‘gift bestowed upon parents’ and should not be treated as an ‘object to be designed’.
This book addresses rapidly emerging bioethical issues in modern society, offering readers profound opportunities for reflection. Sandel poses philosophical questions about human life and value, encouraging readers to view bioethical issues from a broader perspective beyond simple pro-con debates. To grasp the book’s themes, one must first consider the basic concepts of bioethics alongside the social and moral implications brought by advances in genetic engineering.
The author’s primary argument is that ‘children should not be treated as objects to be designed.’ He further asserts that pushing children to study excessively is no different from eugenics, arguing that such practices miss the point of life as a gift. The first basis for this is ‘an inherent moral aversion to genetic enhancement.’ According to the author, genetic enhancement technologies provoke moral aversion because they pursue perfection. Ultimately, this is because genetic enhancement—that is, using medical technology—is not employed to restore natural human functions. The dictionary definition of medicine is the practice of healing human disease. Using medical technology to improve a child’s genetic traits implies viewing the child’s ‘less desirable traits’ as a kind of disease. Can we truly call a child’s naturally occurring trait, one that causes no hindrance whatsoever to living, a disease? The answer is undoubtedly ‘no’. This isn’t merely a matter of moral categories. If we start viewing it as a disease, then ultimately, all of humanity would be suffering from at least one disease.
Second, he argues that those who oppose his position must base their persuasive arguments on utilitarian thought. From a utilitarian perspective, health is akin to a resource—merely a means to maximize happiness and well-being, available when needed. Those opposing the author justify genetic manipulation by arguing that cure and enhancement are not fundamentally different. However, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, healing and enhancement are entirely separate issues. Medical practices in hospitals never aim for enhancement; once a certain level of healing is achieved, patients are gradually discharged. If health were measured on a scale from 1 to 100, reaching 70 or above would have little significant impact on happiness and well-being. In such cases, factors influencing happiness and well-being become external to health itself. Yet, from a utilitarian perspective, health must always converge towards 100, and genetic manipulation is merely one process in a series aimed at achieving this 100. Not only is it impossible to tailor a child’s health to 100 through genetic manipulation, but enhancing traits perceived as relatively inferior to superior ones does not necessarily lead to greater health.
Finally, he argues that genetic manipulation is merely a shortcut to eugenics, which will cause hardship for many children. The author specifically cites the high number of adolescents injured due to excessive exercise driven by parental will as evidence. He states that 70% of young patients suffer injuries from over-exercise, a figure that has increased sevenfold over 25 years. Sports may be just one example of excessive education. However, if extreme results emerge from this single example, one can infer that extending this to the broader scope means parents’ excessive education will lead to negative outcomes for their children.
Furthermore, this problem is not limited to sports alone. Excessive educational fervor negatively impacts not only academic achievement but also psychological well-being. Introducing unreasonable educational methods to boost academic performance inevitably causes children to feel significant academic stress and mental burden. This can ultimately lead to reduced motivation to learn and psychological problems. Parents’ excessive expectations and pressure can also cause frustration in children and become a cause for diminished self-esteem.
What parents should care about most for their children is their happiness. It is clear that parents should provide the necessary resources, time, and opportunities for their child’s happiness and offer unstinting support. However, altering a child’s traits through genetic manipulation is not the right approach. Can this truly make a child happier? In a modern society where parental greed leading to children’s unhappiness is a social issue, one must ask whether children would actually be happier if their genes were manipulated.
Those opposing the author’s argument claim that if genetic manipulation can make children happier, the act can be justified. They would also argue that healing and enhancement should not be viewed as mutually exclusive; they exist on the same spectrum, differing only in degree. Finally, one might say that the ethical problems arising from genetic manipulation stem from people’s misperceptions and are obstacles to be overcome. But conversely, I want to ask: Can the end justify the means? Evaluating a child’s happiness based solely on outward results is extremely harsh when viewed from the child’s perspective. First, it remains unclear how one would even measure the difference in happiness between a child who has not undergone genetic enhancement and one who has. Even if successful in measuring it, finding a significant difference in happiness would likely prove difficult. In some cases, genetic enhancement might even rob a child of their happiness. In other words, genetic enhancement does not guarantee a child’s greater happiness. Furthermore, regarding the argument that healing and enhancement should not be considered dichotomously, I would argue that they must be considered dichotomously. As mentioned earlier, healing and enhancement are distinct concepts and must be strictly separated. Healing is an act performed to restore a certain level of health, while enhancement is an act aimed at making traits more perfect. The concept of “more perfect traits” is not only indefinable but also cannot be equated with health. Finally, I wish to refute the claims of those who assert that genetic enhancement poses no ethical issues. As the author noted, moral aversion to genetic manipulation is not a phenomenon unique to our era. It is one of the traits humanity has acquired through its continuous evolution. To deny this is ultimately tantamount to denying human evolution itself.
Therefore, we must not view this issue merely as a product of scientific progress. Scientific progress does not necessarily align with human happiness, and pursuing advancement without ethical consideration is dangerous. While the love and care parents have for their children is entirely understandable, we must be careful that this love does not flow in the wrong direction. True love lies in respecting children’s individuality and helping them live their own lives. It is not genetic manipulation, but helping children fully realize their potential—that is the true role of parents.
