This blog post examines why Richard Dawkins’ ‘The Selfish Gene’ theory cannot fully explain all complex animal behaviors, using various examples.
In his book ‘The Selfish Gene’, Richard Dawkins presented a creative and innovative interpretation of genes and evolutionary theory. His central argument in this book is that ‘selfish’ genes, which are well-suited to the environment and advantageous for reproduction, survive preferentially over other genes through natural selection. He presents several lines of reasoning to reach this conclusion, all following a basic pattern: observing animal behavior and then explaining the reason for that behavior by linking it to genes. That is, he believes the behavior of every animal on Earth is influenced and determined by genes. (Dawkins introduced the concept of ‘memes’ in the middle of the book, but this concept is presumed to apply only to humans, explaining only human behavior.) While some aspects of Dawkins’ argument are persuasive, others are logically deficient or difficult to readily accept. Now, let’s examine the aspects of his argument that are difficult to accept and the reasons why.
First, the concept of ‘behavior-specific genes’ presented by Dawkins has its shortcomings. Biologist Rosenbauer observed specific behaviors in worker bees and argued that different genes are responsible for the actions of tearing open the caps covering the larvae and abandoning the larvae. Dawkins uses this to explain that genes responsible for specific behaviors exist, and these genes determine animal behavior. However, this theory has limitations because complex behaviors exist that cannot be explained solely by the fact that a gene is expressed. For example, humans exhibit higher-order behaviors like eating with chopsticks or applying makeup; such actions cannot be explained by genes alone. Recognizing this, Dawkins defined the ‘meme’ to explain human cultural behavior. That is, human behavior can be explained by the combination of genes and memes, meaning behavior-specific genes cannot serve as a suitable counterexample for humans. However, according to Dawkins’ theory, memes apply only to humans, so the behavior of other animals must be explained solely by genes.
Yet numerous examples demonstrate that animal behavior is difficult to explain solely through genes. A prime example is monkeys’ banana peeling behavior. Monkeys are known to peel bananas in a manner nearly identical to humans. Can this be viewed as a genetic outcome? In one experiment, newborn monkeys were separated from their parents and cared for over three months before being given a banana. The monkeys were unable to peel it properly. This suggests that the method of peeling banana skins is not genetically determined. While it’s possible to assume monkeys learn how to peel bananas through acquired behavior, this contradicts Dawkins’ theory. If Dawkins’ theory were correct, it would imply humans also possess genes enabling higher-order behaviors through acquired education, rendering the separate introduction of the concept of memes unnecessary. The introduction of memes suggests that Dawkins intended to associate behavior-determining genes only with actions that can be performed without acquired learning. This leads to the conclusion that Dawkins’ theory alone cannot explain the monkey’s banana-peeling behavior.
Furthermore, Dawkins cited only the example of worker bees to substantiate his claim that behavior-determining genes exist, which is logically insufficient. To support his claim, he should have presented at least two or three additional examples to make his argument more convincing to readers. Furthermore, while much has been revealed about genes through advances in cloning technology, the existence of genes responsible for specific behaviors remains unproven. This weakens Dawkins’ argument, and his theory requires further explanation on this point to be more persuasive.
Dawkins’ interpretation of parental favoritism among animal behaviors also lacks persuasiveness. When parents have more than one offspring, they almost invariably show favoritism. Dawkins introduces the concept of relatedness, arguing that a mother’s genetic relatedness to all her offspring is identical, and thus there is no genetic basis for favoritism. However, he interprets favoritism as arising based on the offspring’s age-related life expectancy and independence. For example, when predators threaten, parents protect older offspring more, and when food is scarce, they care more for the youngest, less independent offspring. Yet this interpretation fails to explain cases where offspring neither the first nor the youngest among three or more receive favoritism.
In the case of the North American black duck, parents tend to favor offspring with more colorful plumage, regardless of age. This could serve as a counterexample to Dawkins’ claim, demonstrating that parental favoritism does not necessarily depend solely on expected lifespan or independence. Furthermore, animals like peacocks discriminate among offspring based on appearance or reproductive potential, suggesting that Dawkins’ theory does not apply universally to all animals. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that the reasons for favoritism may be more diverse and to supplement the description accordingly.
Finally, Dawkins’ interpretation of the Thomson’s gazelle’s high-jumping behavior requires further explanation. Dawkins cites Zahavi’s argument, explaining that when a gazelle encounters a predator, its high jump is a signal to display its health status, thereby prompting the predator to chase another individual. While this appears superficially plausible, it lacks explanation as to why the behavior remains an effective strategy if all gazelles exhibit the same action. This strategy can only be effective under the assumption that predators do not remember the health status of individual gazelles, and further explanation is needed on this point.
In conclusion, while Dawkins presented an original theory explaining animal behavior based on genes, his theory still leaves room for counterarguments. The interpretations of behavior-related genes, parental favoritism, and the Thomson’s gazelle’s high-jumping behavior each have shortcomings from various perspectives. Dawkins’ theory still has significant room for development, and his theory could become more persuasive when he supplements his claims and approaches them from diverse viewpoints.
