This blog post distinguishes emotional debate from objective judgment regarding human cloning, offering a dispassionate analysis of its technical feasibility and ethical issues while discussing the practical limitations of human cloning technology.
The book ‘Flesh of My Flesh: The Ethics of Cloning Humans’ comprehensively depicts the background of the successful cloning of Dolly the sheep, the ensuing debate on the possibility of human cloning, and the diverse perspectives and practical constraints surrounding it. Now, over a decade after these writings were composed, the book’s content remains a subject of discussion even from a contemporary perspective where aversion and fear toward somatic cell cloning have somewhat diminished, allowing for a more objective view of the technology. Therefore, this article approaches the discussion on human cloning from two aspects. The first is a critique of unrealistic perspectives on human cloning, and the second is the validity of emotional arguments within the logic opposing human cloning. Furthermore, while conducting these discussions, we also aim to explore what logic should be targeted when opposing human cloning.
A common mistake made by those unfamiliar with science/technology fields like ethics and law when considering human cloning is to approach it not scientifically or technologically, but through images encountered in fiction or fantasy, particularly linked to eugenicist perspectives. Discussions of human cloning based on such imaginative scenarios inevitably build highly improbable, superficially plausible assumptions. Debates about these scenarios and their derived issues obscure the true focus of our discussion: ‘moral deliberation on the realm of achievable technology.’ This book, encompassing diverse fields and perspectives, also suffers from a similar problem.
The most representative and recurring unrealistic discussion is the eugenic or human enhancement concern regarding human cloning. For many in the general public, the concept of human cloning was first encountered through popular media as a work of fiction, long before it was scientifically approached and accepted. Against this backdrop, many non-science scholars tend to view human cloning technology as a godlike technology capable of modifying and manipulating genes according to our will, or as a stepping stone towards such power. In Leon Kass’s essay “The Wisdom of Disgust,” the cloned child is depicted as a “desire-satisfying child,” a narcissistic recreation and a stepping stone to future control. Similarly, the NBAC’s report on human cloning also views the cloned child as an object easily susceptible to eugenic interpretation.
However, the current progress of somatic cell cloning research suggests this may be highly unrealistic. Undeniably, significant social and ethical resistance has greatly hindered such research. Furthermore, the fact that most modern genetic engineering research focuses on studies not requiring embryos via stem cells may also be a reason for the limited progress in somatic cell cloning research. Regardless, eugenic human cloning combining somatic cell cloning technology with genetic engineering remains a realm of impossible dreams, even in the current era where human cloning is theoretically feasible. Even if such a point becomes achievable, the assumption that genes play a dominant role in human trait expression cannot be assured. As Philip Kitcher mentions in ‘Whose Self?’, if identity manifests not only through genetic traits but also depends on life experiences, it remains uncertain whether genes exert a significant influence on the expression of uniquely human traits beyond some simple characteristics (eye color, hair color). In extreme cases, even a society composed solely of cloned humans could form an independent society with individual personalities shaped by their respective living environments.
Much of the discussion based on these scientifically unproven or unprovable premises only serves to amplify the fear surrounding human cloning. This forces us to withhold objective judgment on the actual limits of current human cloning technology or its potential for advancement. In the absence of such objective assessment, the discussion descends into an unstable state devoid of objectivity, ultimately losing its persuasive power.
Of course, human cloning, if actually realized, could indeed lead to various adverse effects. However, the more discussions proceed based on a fundamental aversion to the concept of ‘human cloning’—concealed behind the rhetoric of so-called ‘ethical values’ and ‘the meaning of human existence’—without an objective assessment of these side effects and their utility, the less room there is to utilize human cloning technology without side effects or under a dispassionate evaluation of them. Regardless of the right or wrong of human cloning, this attitude, in the face of emerging new technology, hinders productive and objective judgment and only fosters preconceptions about the technology.
In this context, another common mistake taken from an anti-human cloning stance is to package emotionally driven arguments as if they were objective facts or truths, thereby obscuring the issue. While such emotional arguments may be effective in persuading opponents or the public, whether it is acceptable for judgments about technology and its ethical issues to be based on emotion requires separate discussion.
Much of the text raises issues with viewing human cloning from a utilitarian perspective, citing the objectification of humans and the loss of human uniqueness as primary reasons. However, digging deeper into this discussion reveals it ultimately converges on emotional and subjective moral issues. James D. Watson’s ‘Toward Cloned Humans: Is This What We Want?’ opposes asexually reproduced humans by citing the destruction of individual uniqueness and the parent-child bond, yet this stance is grounded in public disappointment and disgust. Leon Kass, in “The Wisdom of Disgust,” fails to explain the fundamental revulsion felt toward human cloning. He likens this reaction to the inability to provide a rational justification for the aversion to incest, suggesting it should be accepted as an instinctive warning against excessive human intervention. He also defines human cloning as a violation of nature, a departure from natural human methods, and develops his argument based on subjective values assigned to nature and human nature.
From the perspective of opposing human cloning, it is not impossible to emotionally sympathize with such arguments. Indeed, from the viewpoint of opponents, it often feels like the most natural and primary issue that should be discussed. However, I propose that we exclude discussions of emotion from the process of arguing against human cloning. Of course, appealing to the emotional realm can be a more persuasive approach than any argument, and there may be issues where such discussions are necessary. Yet, when it comes to human cloning, distorted emotions—dominated by fear of technology not yet arrived and concerns about the unknown side effects of such technology—easily take hold. This is compounded by the absence of objective judgment regarding the technology itself, as mentioned earlier, rather than an objective emotional appeal to human cloning itself. Even if we exclude such elements through long reflection and deliberation, proceed with our statements and discussions, we cannot change the minds of those who encounter that discussion. Therefore, even assuming we could make an appeal based on pure moral sentiment, free from distorted emotions, expecting that same detachment from the readers of our arguments is unrealistic. In this context, I argue that emotional discussions about human cloning are highly likely to become overly subjective and lacking in substance, and thus should be deferred until the technology actually arrives.
So, what conditions must a reasonable argument against human cloning meet? Above all, it is crucial to view the technology of human cloning objectively before opposing it. We must approach human cloning not as a subjective, emotional issue or as an object of unrealized fear, but as a technology that is actually achievable. We must coolly judge the extent to which genetic manipulation and human cloning are technically and realistically possible, and confine the discussion within those parameters. Through this process, we can establish appropriate boundaries for the discussion on human cloning. Within these boundaries, we can focus our efforts on more crucial debates without losing sight of them, and we can cease contemplating unrealistic scenarios that are unlikely to materialize.
After setting these boundaries for the discussion, we must then concentrate our efforts on calculating the risks of human cloning based on more objective and practical possibilities and justifying those risks. Rather than continuing discussions that merely assert human cloning destroys social values, triggers our fears, and evokes disgust, we should instead discuss the physical burdens and risks that would be imposed on the egg donor, the surrogate mother, or, as in Philip Kitcher’s ‘Whose Self?’, examine the potential for human cloning to be abused in various situations, focusing on the infringement of the cloned child’s rights in such scenarios to maintain persuasiveness.
Discussions on human cloning are fundamentally debates about the legitimacy of a technology that does not yet exist. Given the difficulty of discussing the technical limitations of a technology like human cloning that has not yet been created, the debate often unfolds based on images and ideas in our minds. This can lead to the perception that unrealistic possibilities, which are not objective, might actually be achievable. However, this approach to discussion sometimes highlights debates about certain illusions we believed might become reality. This can overshadow discussions about what is actually achievable and what we should have seriously debated and considered. Consequently, when the technology does arrive, we find ourselves unprepared. Therefore, we must establish clear, practical limitations for the technology of human cloning, which has not yet been realized. Furthermore, within these established limits, we must first focus our efforts on examining various possibilities, objectively estimating the problems that feasible scenarios could cause, developing solutions and countermeasures for them, and, more importantly, contemplating the moral issues these feasible possibilities could raise. Based on these efforts, we must be prepared to welcome the technology of human cloning when it becomes feasible and accessible as an everyday technology, equipped to judge what is ‘right’ and ‘ethical’ regarding human cloning.
