This blog post examines whether Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory explains revolutionary progress in science or supports relativism.
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962, remains a must-read scientific classic and bestseller despite its age. This book made a significant mark on 20th-century philosophy of science. His central claim is that ‘scientific knowledge does not develop through simple accumulation but occurs revolutionarily as paradigms shift.’ His paradigm theory, groundbreaking at the time, profoundly influenced the subsequent competition among numerous theories about ‘truth’. It particularly lent significant weight to those holding a relativistic view of science. This article will compare and consider Kuhn’s paradigm theory and the relativistic position. First, we will explain Kuhn’s paradigm theory, examine the positivist and relativist views of science, and then consider whether his theory truly represents a relativist perspective.
As mentioned in the introduction, Thomas Kuhn’s argument is that scientific knowledge advances through radical scientific revolutions. To use an analogy of a building under construction, when limitations or crises arise, the existing structure collapses, and a new building is constructed in a different way. The etymology of ‘paradigm’ comes from ‘paradeigma,’ which can be understood as meaning ‘example’ or ‘model.’ Since this involves defining a concept previously unused in the history of science, it is not without ambiguity. Thomas Kuhn defines a paradigm as “a totality of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by its members.” While the concept of paradigm has since been refined and re-examined, this article will adopt a flexible understanding of paradigm in its comprehensive sense.
Kuhn states that scientific knowledge undergoes a cycle: normal science → crisis → revolution → normal science. Let’s understand this using the paradigm concept. A group that readily accepts a paradigm is in a state of normal science. When newly discovered facts are resolved within the paradigm but an unsolvable problem emerges, that paradigm faces a crisis. Experts within the paradigm diligently attempt to solve the problem, but when the crisis persists, a new paradigm emerges, leading to a scientific revolution. Once the new paradigm is widely accepted, the group returns to a state of normal science.
Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm theory faced significant criticism after its publication. Among the many critiques, what puzzled me was the ambiguity surrounding the criteria for selecting or accepting a new paradigm. Let’s assume, as Kuhn argued, that a crisis has struck a paradigm, necessitating a new one. If two scientists each propose a new paradigm, A or B, that can explain phenomena not covered by existing knowledge and the existing paradigm O, what criteria should the scientific community use to choose between the two paradigms? It is clear that paradigms A and B are more rational than paradigm O. This is because they can explain the new phenomena. But can the scientific community that belonged to Paradigm O judge which of Paradigms A or B is more rational? In a situation where the paradigm itself shifts, not merely a hypothesis collapsing, one cannot casually compare logical consistency or test predictive power. Therefore, rational factors alone are insufficient for making a judgment. Ultimately, accepting a paradigm inevitably involves irrational elements like personal beliefs or unverifiable intuitive factors. While dealing with irrational elements in science may seem odd, it can be fully understood through relativism.
If you have even a passing interest in philosophy, you’ll likely encounter terms like positivism or relativism. While it requires extensive discussion, a simplified explanation of the positivist view of science is that it rejects metaphysical reasoning and emphasizes the pursuit of truth. It seeks to reach absolute truth through objective criteria like logic or mathematics. Realism, which emerged as a counterpoint to idealism, can also be conflated with positivism in the scientific field. Realism asserts that objects exist independently of the subject. Applied to academia, this position holds that the ultimate goal of scholarship is to pursue truth—an object that exists independently of the investigator’s subjectivity—and that science is the pursuit of this truth. In this context, the two positions can be used interchangeably. Therefore, it may be helpful to think of the positivism discussed later as a ‘position pursuing truth,’ similar to realism. Conversely, in a relativistic view of science, absolute truth does not exist. Scientists holding a positivist view of science may be dissatisfied with determining and following paradigms through non-rational elements, but this is a fact that scientists holding a relativistic view of science can readily accept. Through this lens, Kuhn appears to be a relativist, and the debate over whether his paradigm theory is right or wrong could be seen as a clash between the positivist and relativist perspectives over which is correct. However, it is clear from his own writings that Kuhn rejected and despised the label of relativism. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether Kuhn’s theory truly embodies a relativistic view of science.
If asked to point to a chapter where Kuhn’s relativistic tendencies stand out and sparked controversy, I would cite ‘Progress Through Revolution’. According to Kuhn, the history of science consists of normal science and scientific revolutions. Positivism believes science progresses toward truth within its own domain. However, Kuhn argues that progress occurs through scientific revolutions. Each paradigm shift brings theoretical change, and since knowledge isn’t accumulated, truth is treated as non-existent, which could be interpreted as relativism. This provides grounds to label Kuhn a relativist who doesn’t pursue truth. Yet, this can be interpreted differently. I believe that just as positivists progress toward truth within their domain, something quite similar can occur within normal science. I see the refinement and development of a paradigm within normal science as analogous to positivists progressing toward universal truth. However, in the case of revolution, as expressed in the book’s introduction, progress occurs by breaking free from the concepts of the previous world. It can be described as progress that breaks free from a theory that can no longer accommodate new problems. If positivists progress by advancing toward a predetermined universal truth, then in Kuhn’s case, progress can also be seen as refining theories within a single world while traversing multiple worlds. I don’t believe Kuhn neglected the pursuit of truth. While he didn’t adhere to the absolute universal truths espoused by positivists—and thus cannot be classified as a positivist—he explored the possibility that each paradigm, even if not universal during periods of normal science, could still represent an effort to seek truth, rather than merely being theories that describe phenomena.
The significance of ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ in 20th-century philosophy of science is immense. It gave considerable weight to relativism, becoming the cause of conflict between traditional logical positivism and the new relativism. Yet it seems ironic and amusing that Kuhn himself harbored dissatisfaction with relativists for exploiting his arguments and applying them sociologically.
