In this blog post, I will compare the visions of the future presented in ‘1984’ and ‘Homo Deus’ to highlight the key arguments regarding how technological advancements threaten our freedom.
Advances in science and technology have brought numerous benefits to humanity. The reduction of human labor through automation, rapid and efficient transportation and information transmission, and the development of more powerful and efficient energy sources have fundamentally transformed the way humans interact with nature. Today, things that were unimaginable just a century ago—such as smartphones—occupy a far greater part of our lives than anything that existed back then. This also means that our way of life has changed accordingly, becoming different from what it was before. In one way or another, a person’s life has become unimaginable without technological civilization.
‘Homo Deus’ presents and analyzes one possibility—according to the author—of how science and technology will change and, consequently, how our lives will change as well. Yuval Harari classifies life sciences, information sciences, and neuroscience as the three fields with the greatest potential, and suggests that when these three fields reach a certain pinnacle, there is a possibility that “Homo Deus”—a new species of humanity—will emerge, creating a being entirely different from humanity as we know it. He argues that such changes will occur regardless of the beliefs humanity currently holds about itself, and that, as a result, those very beliefs will undergo a transformation. He predicts that advances in biotechnology will shift the goal of medicine from treating disease to enhancing human physical capabilities, and that this shift in perspective may lead to attempts to replace the human body with mechanical components in order to conquer death.
Furthermore, he argues that computer algorithms—or artificial intelligence—capable of analyzing a person through the information they produce will develop. He suggests that this will go beyond merely understanding a person through information; instead, these intangible computer algorithms will better understand the choices a person will make and which choices will bring them the greatest satisfaction. Furthermore, he predicts that if it is revealed that the human mind and thoughts are nothing more or less than biological and chemical signals occurring within the brain, all concepts associated with human reason and the mind will collapse, and beyond that, science and technology will seek to alter the mind and reason themselves.
Yuval Harari appears to be striving to present his arguments from as neutral a perspective as possible, but in the final chapter, while emphasizing that the questions he raises are ones everyone should consider, he subtly reveals that he harbors negative thoughts about such a future. Reflections on this kind of future world are evident not only in academic works like ‘Homo Deus’, which are based on the author’s own analysis and research, but also in various novels. Notable examples include ‘1984’, ‘Brave New World’, and ‘A Clockwork Orange’. While these novels use different themes and narrative styles, their underlying central theme can be seen as human freedom and resistance against the control of civilization or power. In other words, they emphasize that in a society with highly advanced science, human freedom and the firm belief in it must be upheld in the face of political powers that control citizens through the use of technology.
The most fundamental commonality between ‘Homo Deus’ and these novels lies in the grandest ideal that humanity currently pursues. This paper will analyze the commonalities between the two future worlds depicted in ‘Homo Deus’ and ‘1984’ to verify their accuracy. Next, we will explore why we fear the collapse of such ideals and examine their value.
As mentioned earlier, the future world of ‘Homo Deus’ primarily takes on three distinct forms.
• The replacement of the human body through biotechnology and the resulting physical immortality of humans • Predictions about human nature itself through the selection and classification of all information regarding an individual • The futility of human choice and artificial mental manipulation revealed by advances in neuroscience
While these predictions clearly face numerous challenges that must be overcome, they currently appear to be entirely plausible. Clearly, biotechnology is exploring the possibility of human modification, starting with curing fatal genetic diseases through methods such as genetic engineering, while Facebook analyzes customer data to deliver targeted advertisements. Furthermore, depression is treated through medication alongside basic psychological counseling. It seems difficult to imagine that taking all of these developments to their most advanced forms would not lead to the same conclusion I have reached.
Parts of this vision of the future are similarly depicted in ‘1984’. From the novel’s opening, which introduces the protagonist Winston, the massive surveillance system and the power of information technology that made it possible are described. In the text, the government monitors every aspect of individuals’ daily lives through a device called the “television screen.” Every utterance and action of an individual is transmitted and received as information. Furthermore, throughout the novel, it is described how the extent of surveillance and control over individuals extends even into the realms of emotion and human nature. And in the latter part of the novel, we glimpse the attempt by a massive power to control and alter an individual’s thoughts by inflicting brutal violence upon them.
This resembles the disciplinary society mentioned in Michel Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’. Originating from Bentham’s Panopticon, this concept refers to a system in which the prison has expanded to encompass the entire society. According to Foucault, this “prison system” narrows the scope of disciplinary violations and imposes harsher punishments, thereby producing criminals through the system itself. He argues that as such disciplinary mechanisms become widespread around us, the root of the problem lies not in the rehabilitation of prisoners, the conscience of the judiciary, or the rightness or wrongness of the system, but rather in the effect of power achieved through the carceralization of society as a whole and the quantitative increase in objective discipline. This statement casts doubt on the existence of a massive power structure, yet it does not deny that there are classes, groups, individuals, and subjects who gain a dynamic advantage by creating such structures.
And this is where the difference between ‘1984’ and ‘Homo Deus’ becomes apparent. The biggest difference between ‘1984’ and ‘Homo Deus’—as anyone can sense—is the presence or absence of massive control over humanity. To be more precise, it is the presence or absence of intentional control based on power relations. Clearly, Yuval Harari did not claim that advanced biotechnology, information technology, and neuroscience could grant anyone the power to control every aspect of an individual. However, such a possibility is certainly worth discussing, and even without positing a massive meta-subject, humanity could be stripped of the concept of freedom—a concept we hold dear—by such technologies.
In the prison society described by Foucault, everyone is subjected to the discipline of power. They are constantly under surveillance and forced to live within the bounds of that discipline. Consequently, violent images of criminals are mass-produced, and anything that transcends that discipline is imbued with a sensational and unpleasant aura. However, in the digital and information society, the Panopticon metaphor may be replaced by something entirely new, allowing the central “watchtower” to disappear. A society where everyone monitors everyone else—and where everyone is bound to one another—may be a product of a transitional era that precedes the realization of Yuval Harari’s vision; in other words, it may occur before artificial intelligence comes to understand everything about us and attempts to control our desires and will.
This is made even clearer by the fact that dozens of pieces of information about a single individual circulate through cyberspace, and we cannot even know who is accessing whose information. Because of this uncertainty, we have become unable to judge whether we are being controlled or not. We need a clear understanding of our desires, will, and minds as a basis for determining that the future world depicted in ‘Homo Deus’ is wrong.
We are outraged by any attempt to deprive us of freedom. We constantly emphasize that it is the most important value and something that can never be taken away. In reality, it took quite a long time from the emergence of the concept of freedom until the recognition that everyone possesses it took hold. Nevertheless, once the idea that everyone has freedom took root, it spread across the globe in the blink of an eye. Those who rejected freedom rather than defending it were condemned, while those who sacrificed for freedom were praised. Like many values cherished by humanity, freedom has received tremendous attention in recent times.
Similarly, the concept of freedom in ‘Homo Deus’, ‘1984’, and ‘Discipline and Punish’ all take a negative stance toward a certain form of control. In particular, in ‘Discipline and Punish’, Michel Foucault expresses deep fear that we might become guards of the “Panopticon,” monitoring one another without even realizing it. This is an argument that will likely be further reinforced in connection with the information technology discussed in ‘Homo Deus’.
The essential question we must ask in this regard is why freedom must not be controlled. Why must freedom be free? To answer this, we must examine in greater detail what freedom is, what we should call freedom, and why we pursue it.
Conceptually speaking, freedom is inevitably linked to desire. Freedom originates from the desire to do something. This presupposes three things: These are human “desire,” the “mind” that feels it, and the “will” that acts upon it. Let us first examine desire. Desire is related to what we want and demand. We desire something because we feel a need for it—even if it seems irrational. Desire is that emotion or sensation of feeling that something is very important and wanting to possess it.
Desire, sometimes expressed as yearning or longing, is inseparably linked to the mind. If we consider desire without the role of the mind, nothing remains in desire other than a specific object. In other words, the place where desire resides lies between the object of desire and the mind that perceives it. Desire can be understood as a specific relationship between the mind and the object, or as the object as perceived by the mind. The question then shifts to defining the mind.
The same applies to will. Will can be thought of as the unconditional pursuit of a specific goal, which, from a certain perspective, can be observed as a stubborn insistence on possession. In other words, it is a fixation on a specific direction aimed at satisfying a particular desire. Through this process, the desire that has already arisen becomes objectified and transforms into a mind that desires that desire; this mind that desires the desire can be said to be translated into will.
From this perspective, both desire and will are associated with the mind. Both are mediated by the mind. Therefore, a fundamental understanding of the mind—specifically, an understanding of the mind as the foundation upon which needs or desires operate—serves as the basis for a deeper understanding of freedom.
For this reason, we will examine the current thinking of neuroscientists and neurophilosophers regarding the mind. By highlighting the arguments they use to refute existing defenses of the definition of the mind—specifically, the view that the mind cannot be reduced to neural interactions—we aim to clarify the claim that the mind is inseparably linked to neurons.
There is no doubt that the mind is one of the subjects that neuroscience finds difficult to address. Well-known cognitive philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, and Steven Pinker have each attempted, in their own ways, to integrate scientific facts into their philosophical discourse. The Computational Theory of Mind, which views the brain as a computer-like calculator and develops discussions about the mind from that perspective, was one of the mainstream theories; however, there were also those who maintained a more reserved stance and sought to approach the mind with greater caution.
Daniel Dennett seeks to explore the possibility of explaining the mind by introducing the concept of “intentionality.” Dennett criticizes the common view that consciousness is the most striking difference between humans and other beings, even though humanity has acquired its current consciousness and mind through the evolution of life originating from simple molecules. He states that even the giant molecules that formed the first life forms long ago “appeared” to be moving toward some specific purpose. In other words, entities that humans have traditionally regarded as lacking consciousness and mind exhibited behaviors that seemed to possess a certain purpose.
Based on this, to investigate a specific phenomenon, we assume that the subject of that phenomenon is an agent possessing a purpose or desire. This is the concept of “intentionality.” Dennett argues that intentionality sufficiently explains phenomena associated with an object, regardless of whether a mind actually exists within that object or not. He warns that our common belief—that consciousness and the mind are too high-level to be explained by neural signals—is actually due to our own biases, which prevent us from viewing phenomena objectively.
The Churchlands share a similar view on this matter. In her book, Patricia Churchland expresses a reductionist stance regarding mental states and, by extension, theories of the mind. She attempts to dismantle, through her own reductionist logic, two opposing views: the skeptical opinion that it is impossible to use scientific methodology to explore neurons and express cognition and thought due to their inherent complexity; and the view that more complex and higher-order—as she puts it—psychological elements possess an emergent nature akin to a kind of “logic” and therefore constitute a field of study independent of neuroscience.
She argues that the reason current neurological theories seem so far removed from the mind is, first, due to preconceptions—as Dennett suggests—and second, because there is still no dominant brain theory that clearly articulates the relationships between neurons to easily explain “phenomena.” In other words, the fields of neuroscience and cognitive science still require further research, and just as “light” and “electromagnetic waves” were found to be the same, and “phlogiston” and “oxygen” were found to be the same, the mind can also be reduced through a fully developed theory.
So far, these discussions do not constitute the best explanation of the mind. More experiments and more rigorous verification are needed. Furthermore, there is a very real possibility that a neurological approach to freedom or the mind could render the question “Why is that so?” completely meaningless, explaining it simply as “That is just the way it is.” It remains unclear whether such explanations will truly resolve our curiosity about causality or whether they will merely stop at explaining correlations.
However, as Yuval Harari points out, regardless of whether these explanations are right or wrong, the scientific and technological changes he predicts are still taking place. Therefore, the discussion below will proceed on the premise that the mind is nothing more than complex neurological activity, and that all human thought is based on this.
Why is freedom an issue?
Yuval Harari’s critique of “humanism” is valid. Whether it is truly a religion or not, it is undeniable that humanity currently attaches great significance to “basic human values” such as freedom, equality, and human rights. These values are deeply embedded in all aspects of life, serving as the foundation for the establishment of social institutions and the practice of morality. “1984” is also a novel written on this basis. Any infringement upon “basic human rights and interests” is treated as an evil. In that sense, we must also reflect more deeply on the meaning contained in the final three questions of ‘Homo Deus’.
These final three questions are clearly doubts regarding “human fundamentals.” Yuval Harari hints at his belief that the future world he has devoted the entire book to describing is inappropriate. For example, if morality, freedom, and all such things are merely chemical and electrical reactions, on what basis and how can we make judgments about manipulating them? In his book, Dawkins wrote the optimistic statement that humans are the only living beings capable of escaping the selfishness of genes. Furthermore, contemporary evolutionary psychology continues its exploration based on the logic that human sociability is also a product of evolution.
Why has Richard Dawkins not—or been unable to—shed this optimistic view of humanity? If the concepts we call the most essential aspects of humanity are revealed to be merely complex material interactions—or at least if we proceed on that assumption—then the final three questions become meaningless.
Those questions make us feel as though we can alter the tide of change through our own power. This is because the underlying reasoning affirms our agency and will, and because it asserts that the power to govern that flow lies with us. However, the question of whether an organism is merely an algorithm is a factual statement, one that requires scientific verification, and therefore not a proposition for us to judge. Similarly, the value of intelligence and consciousness is not something for us to assess.
Questions regarding human freedom and its capabilities have always existed. However, these questions have all committed the error of placing human freedom itself at the foundation of their answers. Those who posed these questions were at a loss in the face of their own moral sentiments. We continue to fail to pose precise questions about science and technology.
In conclusion, freedom has swept through human society like a fierce wave. And the discourse on its control and suppression has also continued unabated. Now, we worry that science and technology will control us. However, as stated earlier, a relatively realistic perspective on science and technology compels us to question whether we even possess freedom.
Science and technology themselves do not pose any questions to us; they simply bear down upon us. Science and technology are, in and of themselves, already change. We will accept them just as we responded to technological advancements in the past—and we will do so with great enthusiasm. We continue to depict the dystopia these technologies will create as a deeply negative world, but just as we first introduced machines into our production systems, we will accept them regardless.
Whatever it does, by the time it arrives, it is nothing more than change. Before we pose questions as if we were some noble entity possessing something great, we must first recognize how science and technology render us powerless in the face of that “something”.
