In this blog post, we will naturally explore the content, impressions, and core messages of the book, focusing on ‘An Analysis of Korea’s Real Estate Problems Through Kang Jun-man’s ‘The Real Estate Plunder State”’.
Introduction
Kang Jun-man’s ‘The Real Estate Plunder State (How Did Apartments Become a Monster Without Blood or Tears?)’ presents a distorted self-portrait of Korean society as seen through the author’s perspective. It sharply critiques Korea’s contradictory real estate policies, which have solidified into a structure where the housing issue—essential to human life—benefits only a select few under the guise of “investment,” while the majority is sacrificed.
Historical Diagnosis: Land Issues and Power Structures
It is true that the view diagnosing the causes of the Joseon Dynasty’s frequent foreign invasions—due to its weak national power—as merely a result of a weak government and factional strife is accurate. However, upon closer examination, Joseon was fundamentally a nation far removed from the ideal of “a wealthy nation and a strong military,” and behind the fierce factional strife lay a more significant structural problem: a system where one had to seize another’s livelihood—even by killing them—just to survive. At the heart of this lies the persistent land issue. Land granted to the king was, in principle, supposed to revert to the state upon his death, but as it was passed down through generations, state finances were depleted. With insufficient land to grant to officials, their salaries became inadequate, leading them to exploit the common people through extortion—a major cause of the nation’s decline.
Even during the Japanese colonial period and in the political situation following liberation, the core issue remained the transfer of land titles to tenant farmers, but while many campaign promises were made, implementation fell short. This historical background illustrates how the intertwining of land and power has deepened social inequality.
The Formation of the Modern Real Estate Market and the Hypocrisy of Policy
The epic drama “Land,” scheduled to air on MBC in 1991, was originally planned as a 50-episode series but was cut short after only 16 episodes. The fact that the plan to expose the realities of power, conglomerates, and speculators from the 1960s to the 1980s was halted due to pressure from the regime indicates just how sensitive the issue was and how much the government feared that the hypocrisy of its real estate policies would be exposed.
The author sharply exposes the problems of the real estate sector with the spirit of a lone warrior, covering the period from the real estate policies of the 1970s to the present. The author argues that the “Gangnam myth,” which has come to symbolize Korea, was the result of the Park Chung-hee regime personally spearheading real estate ventures to raise funds for the 1971 presidential election. The corrupt dictatorship and the chaebols colluded to secure bank loans for the purchase of non-commercial land, forming a mutually beneficial structure in which they provided political funds in return.
By colluding with relevant government officials to obtain development information in advance, they signaled the beginning of full-scale speculation, and the power of apartment speculation was revealed in the 1977 Apgujeong-dong Hyundai Apartments preferential allocation scandal. The real estate boom began to materialize after the 1988 Olympics, and the myth of the “invincible apartment market” took shape. In particular, Gangnam became the object of parents’ envy due to intense educational fervor and the concentration of top school districts, causing prices to skyrocket.
Successive governments built numerous new towns to curb soaring real estate prices but failed to find a fundamental solution. Instead, they accelerated the expansion of Seoul and the metropolitan area, creating a “Seoul Republic,” while the provinces declined during this period, making balanced national development a distant dream. The author argues that current real estate policies amount to nothing more than superficial Band-Aid solutions, and that fundamental price stability is impossible without a paradigm shift in policy.
Alternatives and Challenges
The author presents several practical alternatives to solve the problem. First, the relocation of national agencies to Sejong City must be put into action. He believes a large-scale relocation of secondary public institutions to regional areas is necessary.
Second, prestigious universities must be relocated to regional areas. However, this must be systematically implemented to ensure that regional campuses of prestigious universities do not instill a sense of inferiority in their students.
Third, national-level policy support and incentives are needed to encourage the relocation of large corporations’ headquarters to regional areas and to create jobs.
Fourth, the government should encourage companies to sell non-business-use land and strengthen tax increases on homeowners who own two or more apartments.
Fifth, we must continue to build long-term rental housing for those without homes and strengthen tenant protection laws to counter the abuses of landlords.
The fact that one of the causes of the Donghak Revolution was the extortionate practices of Go-bu County Magistrate Jo Byeong-gap serves as a reminder that this bears a direct resemblance to today’s landlords raising rents. The “Chebu-dong Gungjung Jokbal incident” is cited as a case in point. Furthermore, it can be argued that gentrification is fundamentally linked to the behavior of landlords who, driven by greed, seek to erode the fruits of labor cultivated by tenant farmers.
In response to such arguments, some criticize them as “communist thinking” or as excessive measures that infringe on private property rights. However, the author firmly rejects the notion that this status quo truly leads to social well-being. He warns that unless the current policy direction is changed, the real estate crisis will continue to worsen due to the endless greed of the privileged class, even if the government changes.
